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small- and mid-sized Mexican businesses
have lacked adequate financing, result-
ing in bottlenecks in the production of




It is in this context that the recent
upsurge in business lending takes on
particular importance. Consumer lending
has been growing rapidly for many years
now, but business lending was relatively
restrained before the fourth quarter of
last year, when real year-over-year
growth reached 15 percent (Chart 2).
Through the first quarter of 2005, aggre-
gate business loans continued to grow
strongly at a rate of 17 percent.
Crisis and the Beginning
of Reform 
A few years prior to the Tequila Crisis,
Mexico privatized its commercial banks
after a decade of government owner-
ship. During that decade, the banks had
channeled most lending to the federal
government. As a result, credit and mar-
ket risk assessment were minimal. 
Once privatized, the banks took
can help individuals tap future income
for present critical needs, such as hous-
ing and education. 
Three years ago, in this same publi-
cation, we advocated financial globaliza-
tion, using Mexico’s banks as a case
study.
3 We concluded that the growing
prominence of foreign firms in the Mex-
ican banking system (Chart 1) was not
cause for alarm, but would promote
world-class banking practices, enhance
financial competition and result in
greater financial stability. This was not to
say Mexico’s banking system was in par-
ticular need of foreign involvement, but
rather represented our view that interna-
tional competition can promote eco-
nomic and financial rigor in any country.
Our analysis contrasted sharply with
globalization’s detractors, who broadly
claim foreign influences and interna-
tional linkages are harmful. 
Today, many of the benefits we
claimed would result from the interna-
tional openness of Mexico’s banking sys-
tem have been realized, but business
lending has been slow to resume. In par-
ticular, evidence suggests that certain
Beyond the Border
ince the Tequila Crisis of
1994–95, one of Mexico’s most
persistent and striking economic
contradictions has been a recovery in
economic growth coupled with stagna-
tion in bank lending. This contradiction
has fueled increasing concerns about
bottlenecks within Mexico’s production
chains and about what some analysts
view as expansion rates below potential. 
Lending typically declines in the
wake of a financial shock, and Mexico’s
Tequila Crisis was no exception. Mex-
ico’s currency lost half its value in just a
few months. The interbank interest rate
rose some 60 percentage points, to over
90 percent, and remained above 20 per-
cent until late 1999. Mexican banks
needed most of their resources to
resolve problem assets, leaving little
room for new lending. 
Even worse, credit extended by
Mexico’s banks continued to fall long
after the national economy had recov-
ered. Compared with other countries in
similar circumstances, Mexico’s stagna-
tion in lending has been unusually
severe and long-lasting.
1
However, Mexican banks report that
business loans began to grow substantially
in fourth quarter 2004 and that healthy
growth rates continued through the first
quarter of this year, signaling a possible
reversal of the credit slump of the past
10 years. We address the credit slump’s
possible causes, its implications and what
the nascent loan upturn seems to be
telling us.
Globalization and Bank Credit
A vibrant banking system that grow-
ing businesses can turn to for credit facil-
itates firms’ entry into previously seg-
mented markets, enhancing competition.
The availability of finance promotes eco-
nomic freedom by enabling entrepre-
neurs to leverage resources in pursuit of
business opportunities.
2 Similar consider-
ations apply to consumer credit, which
S
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the steep auction prices at which they
had been bought. The result was high-
risk lending to the private sector. Incom-
plete legal enforcement of financial con-
tracts, an underdeveloped system of
supervision and regulation, an implied
unlimited government guarantee of bank
liabilities and the banks’ own inexperi-
ence in assessing the risks associated
with lending to the private sector aggra-
vated the problem. Bank lending
expanded at an average annual rate of
25 percent from 1989 through 1994,
resulting in a quadrupling of bank credit
as a percent of GDP.
Bank credit to the private sector
serves a vital economic role when prop-
erly extended, but this undisciplined
explosion in lending gave rise to imbal-
ances. At the end of 1994, Mexican
banks’ risky loans became more precari-
ous with the collapse of the peso and
subsequent jumps in inflation and inter-
est rates. The Tequila Crisis devastated
the ability, and in some cases the will-
ingness, of borrowers to repay their
debt. The banks’ financial condition
deteriorated severely. 
Government programs to support
the banking system took on a variety of
forms. The government initiated pro-
grams to improve bank balance sheets
by easing debtor burden.  Discounts on
loan balances and future payments were
offered. Their cost was shared by the
government and the banks. For the most
part, the general public regarded these
programs with indifference.
In contrast, the government’s for-
bearance policy for the banks them-
selves was wildly unpopular. The public
viewed it as a taxpayer bailout of bank
shareholders. Under the Loan Purchase
and Recapitalization Program, the gov-
ernment gave the banks good bonds in
exchange for bad loans. Suspicions were
widespread that many of the loans were
granted or defaulted upon fraudulently
or had been extended to insiders. These
bonds helped prevent failure, but their
high volume and nonnegotiable nature
constrained liquidity (Chart 3). At the
hardest hit banks, shareholder value was
substantially reduced or even eliminated.
The crisis’ effect on the banks led
many to question their privatization.
There is much evidence that the source
of bank problems was not privatization
itself, but the lack of regulatory, risk
management and legal infrastructure.
Whatever its liabilities, the Tequila Crisis
highlighted these problems and moti-
vated change.
Loan Growth in the Mexican Banking System
Real year-over-year growth (percent)
Chart 2
NOTES: Government interventions and loan sales preclude accurate and consistent calculations of year-over-year loan growth prior to 2001.
Consumer loans do not include mortgages. As of year-end 2004, real year-over-year growth in mortgage loans was 2.4 percent, the
first real increase in six years. As of March 31, 2005, mortgage loan growth was sustained, with a portfolio increase of 5.3 percent
year-over-year in real terms.
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The Tequila Crisis
devastated the ability, 
and in some cases 
the willingness, of
borrowers to repay 
their debt. The banks’
financial condition
deteriorated severely.
 The Promise of Sustained
Loan Growth
An examination of the primary prob-
lems inhibiting growth in lending activity
over the past 10 years reveals substantial
progress toward resolution, suggesting
the recent widespread growth in lending
will continue.
Reparation. The fallout from the
Tequila Crisis explains banks’ initial re-
luctance to lend. Banks had to work out
problem loans, raise their low capital
levels and engineer a quality-led escape
from high funding costs. Other problems
included generally inefficient operations
and inadequate information technology.
In response, the banks streamlined their
operations, rationalized costs and gener-
ated increased revenue. For most of the
largest banks, however, full balance
sheet recovery did not occur until for-
eign banks began to purchase them.
These purchases, which commenced in
2000, often involved infusions of capital. 
One reason for the delayed business
credit recovery involves the nonnego-
tiable notes the government gave banks
in trade for their bad loans. Banks could
not sell these bonds and use the pro-
ceeds to lend to businesses. Beginning
in the fourth quarter of this year, the
nonnegotiable notes will begin to mature
and will likely be rolled over into nego-
tiable notes. These new notes will pro-
vide banks with a fresh source of liquid-
ity, as the notes will no longer tie down
bank funds that otherwise could be
diverted to support loan growth. 
Regulatory and Risk Management
Infrastructure. The years following the 
Tequila Crisis have been a time of pro-
found regulatory change. Mexican regul-
ations now generally conform to interna-
tional standards—or are even more
demanding—in risk management, inter-
nal control policies and loan provisioning.
At the time of the Tequila Crisis, and
for many years thereafter, credit bureaus
were not fully developed and banks did
not use them. However, a subsequent
regulatory change requires banks to
obtain, review and document a bor-
rower’s past repayment performance and
current financial situation before making
a loan. Consumer and mortgage loans
extended without following these proce-
dures are subject to a specific reserve
requirement equal to 100 percent of the
loan balance.
Though reluctant at first, bankers
now embrace these procedures. Credit
bureaus have grown in importance, and
the public now values a good credit rat-
ing, helping to establish a positive repay-
ment culture. With the new credit rating
infrastructure, consumer lending has
experienced strong, sustained growth.
Spillovers of these methods and tech-
nologies, together with increased regula-
tory attention on all types of lending,
suggest business credit is poised to
expand.
Bank Loan Portfolios in Mexico
Chart 3
NOTE: The government category includes the government notes issued in resolving the banking difficulties of the mid-1990s.
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For most of the 
largest banks, full 
balance sheet recovery 
did not occur until
foreign banks began




infusions of capital. Legal Infrastructure. Another impedi-
ment to loan growth, and secured lend-
ing in particular, has been the legal envi-
ronment. Understaffing and overwork
have plagued the Mexican courts. Court
personnel, especially judges, tend to be
poorly paid. These problems have been
particularly acute at the local level. Many
bankers and industry analysts feel the
local courts are corrupt and susceptible
to political meddling. And, until rela-
tively recently, Mexican bankruptcy and
collateral repossession laws were vague
and heavily tilted in favor of the bor-
rower. As a result, banks turning to the
judicial system to collect delinquent
loans often found the proceedings
lengthy and unfruitful. Before the recent
reforms, observers indicated court deci-
sions on foreclosure and repossession
required at least five years. 
Recent years, however, have ush-
ered in significant improvements in Mex-
ico’s legal infrastructure. In 2000, the
Mexican Congress passed a law imple-
menting new processes governing bank-
ruptcy and the repossession of collateral.
A subsequent reform in 2003 further clar-
ified the resolution process behind bank-
ruptcy and loan default. 
Anecdotal reports suggest the laws
overhauling bankruptcy proceedings
and detailing collateral repossession
have proven generally effective and
have greatly shortened the time for a
decision. Moreover, most such cases
now can be resolved outside the court
system. These options have also permit-
ted financial institutions to become more
adept at working directly with customers
in encouraging payment. 
Still, in some cases, contract enforce-
ment may be difficult. Property rights
systems involve numerous mutually rein-
forcing institutions. Some local authori-
ties responsible for enforcing property
rights in Mexico are still weak, reflecting
the country’s not too distant history of
authoritarian rule. These circumstances
may prove difficult to remedy, as they
can involve political institutions or infor-
mal customs.
5
Even so, positive financial system
developments associated with improve-
ments in the legal infrastructure are not
hard to find. Mexico’s burgeoning asset-
backed securities market is testament to
a growing faith in the enforceability of
secured lending contracts. Despite a
slight rise in interest rates over the sec-
ond half of the year, Mexico’s securitiza-
tion market almost quadrupled in 2004,
making it the top such market in Latin
America. Some examples of new, struc-
tured financial transactions include secu-
ritizations of truck, auto and credit card
loans, as well as municipal and state
government debt. Mexico’s first mort-
gage-backed security (MBS) issuance oc-
curred in December 2003. The MBS mar-
ket increased from a single $53 million
issuance in that year to six issuances
totaling $477 million in 2004. Continued
economic and political stability, emer-
gence of new securitization products for a
broader group of assets and liberaliza-
tion of regulations have all worked to
increase institutional demand for securi-
tized assets. All this bodes well for con-
tinued expansion in bank lending activ-
ity.
Bank Competition. In their continu-
ing struggle to regain adequate financial
footing in the wake of the Tequila Crisis,
banks invested in government securities,
replaced high-cost time deposits and
borrowings with low-cost demand
deposits, cut overhead expenses through
layoffs, shed unprofitable operations,
and pushed up transaction volume and
service fee income. Opportunities for
further advances along these lines
appear rather limited. Net interest mar-
gins have thinned and stabilized. With
increased accuracy in credit scoring,
monitoring and contract enforcement, a
return to loan markets seems to be the
next step in increasing profitability.
Economic Conditions and Loan De-
mand. In spite of strong economic
growth, high real interest rates and price
fluctuations did not moderate in Mexico
until 1999–2000. By then, business lend-
ing seemed ready to grow, but the sub-
sequent economic slowdown in the
United States stalled economic growth in
Mexico and ended the momentum be-
hind the initial signs of credit expansion.
Fortunately, economic growth has
resumed in both the United States and
Mexico. The comovement of these two
economies partly reflects the unifying ef-
fects of 1995’s North American Free Trade
Agreement in promoting further integra-
tion of their business and economic cycles
(Chart 4). The increase in loan demand
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Recent years 





 associated with stronger economic activ-
ity should work along with the other fac-
tors discussed to generate lasting growth
in business loans at Mexico’s banks.
Outlook 
Mexico represents a unique banking
opportunity. Macroeconomic conditions
are stable and improving, the country’s fi-
nancial infrastructure continues to de-
velop and modernize, and business cycle
convergence with the United States should
help spur future growth. Slowly but sure-
ly, various impediments to the supply of,
and demand for, business loans have been
resolved. By rebuilding capital and im-
proving risk management systems, Mex-
ico’s banks have positioned themselves
to take advantage of the positive trends
shaping business loan demand. Stable
net interest margins and limited ability to
raise fees and cut costs will help propel
the supply of loans as banks pursue pro-
fits to boost shareholder value. 
These considerations suggest Mex-
ico’s 10-year slump in business lending
is over. Lending’s rejuvenation is the lat-
est step in the monumental restoration of
Mexico’s banking system, characterized
by sound loan growth and the types of
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Economic Conditions in Mexico Compared with the United States
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to take advantage of the
positive trends shaping 
business loan demand.